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  Regulation and litigation are two different, although often complementary approaches, to 
dealing with externalities. Where regulation takes an ex-ante approach, establishing rules that force 
parties to internalize externalities, litigation relies on ex-post deterrence. Indeed, litigation can be 
thought of as a form of ex-post regulation administered by the courts. However, as discussed by 
Posner in this volume, if ex-post damages are large, “the injurer may not have sufficient resources to 
pay the penalty.” In such cases, the presence of an “ex-post enforcement problem”
2 suggests courts 
are likely to fail, and ex-ante regulation is the more effective policy tool. 
  In this work, we study a particular policy problem – California’s efforts to ensure the 
earthquake safety of its hospital infrastructure. Until quite recently, the State had a relatively weak 
regulatory system in place. The State enacted its original hospital seismic safety requirements in 
1973, following the 1971 Sylmar earthquake, which killed 48 people at a Veterans Administration 
hospital. The 1973 requirements applied only to the construction of new hospital buildings; existing 
                                                            
1 * E-mail: tyc@mit.edu or jacobson@nber.org. Prepared for the NBER Regulation and Litigation Conference 
2 A term used by Shleifer at the 2009 NBER Regulation and Litigation Conference proceedings. 2 
 
hospital buildings were indefinitely exempt. As suggested by a wrongful death case after the 2003 
San Simeon earthquake (discussed in more detail below), older hospital buildings were, at least in 
principle, subject to the threat of ex-post litigation. The ineffectiveness of ex-post litigation in this 
context is highlighted, however, by the fact that many hospitals responded to the legislation by 
deferring new construction in favor of extending the lifespan of their existing buildings. As such, the 
1973 law had the perverse effect of increasing the susceptibility of California’s hospitals to seismic 
damage. This failure had real consequences in 1994 when 23 hospitals had to suspend some or all 
services due to structural damage sustained during the Northridge earthquake.
3  
In many respects reliance on ex-post litigation to ensure disaster preparedness seems 
foolhardy. The potential losses and liabilities from a major earthquake are so large as to strain the 
limited solvency of hospitals. The limited liability of hospitals creates significant problems for ex-
post regulation since the expected private costs for any given hospital are likely to be far below the 
expected social cost. As a result, California responded to the 1994 Northridge earthquake by 
enacting an extensive regulatory scheme to ensure hospital seismic safety.  
While ex-ante regulation may be an obvious choice for disaster preparedness efforts, the 
specific form of regulation adopted is critically important. Traditional regulatory approaches can be 
both needlessly costly, and generate significant unintended negative consequences. In the context of 
California’s recent earthquake safety mandate for hospitals, the State adopted a traditional command 
and control type regulatory approach, mandating a timeline by which all general acute care (GAC) 
hospitals must retrofit or rebuild to remain (1) standing and (2) operational following a major 
seismic event. The latter goal – ensuring that all hospitals can maintain operations– was tantamount 
as the Northridge earthquake caused disruption in services at 23 hospitals but little hospital-related 
                                                            
3 See §130000.8 of the Alfred E. Alquist Hospital Facilities Seismic Safety Act, available at 
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/FDD/seismic_compliance/SB1953/SeismicRegs/hssa.pdf 3 
 
injury or death. While hospitals can apply for low-interest loans and bonds from several State and 
federal sources, they are given no direct financial assistance.
4 Estimates of the direct costs of 
compliance with the mandate vary but all put the price tag in the tens of billions of dollars.
5  
  The sheer magnitude of these direct compliance costs has lead to significant and unintended 
distortions in whether and how hospitals provide care. By requiring all hospitals to reach the same 
earthquake standard, many of those in the highest risk areas are closing or merging, effectively 
eroding access in the very areas the State sought to protect. We argue that “market-based” regulatory 
approaches, specifically the cap and trade type mechanisms that have grown in popularity in the 
context of environmental policy, hold specific promise for disaster management.  
We proceed by first describing the evolution of California’s approach to ensuring the seismic 
safety of its hospital infrastructure, from an implicit reliance on ex-post litigation to the current very 
detailed regulatory approach. We trace out some unintended consequences of the current regulation 
for the availability of hospital services. We provide a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the tradeoff 
the State has made to ensure hospital operations after a seismic event in this way. Finally, we discuss 
a market-based trading system for earthquake-safe bed obligations that could achieve the same 
functional goal as the mandate – to ensure that hospitals can sustain and, most importantly, remain 
operational following a major seismic event – but at a lower cost in terms of money, time, and the 
long-term availability of services. This approach could be adapted to other mandates that take a one-
size-fits-all approach to compliance such as the uniform energy efficiency requirements for new 
building construction included as part of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009.
6 
 
Background: California’s Seismic Retrofit Requirements 
                                                            
4 These sources, which are general in nature, include the CalMortgage and HUD 242 insurance programs.   
5 Mead and Hillestand (2007) provide the most recent and most comprehensive estimate – $45 to $110 billion   
6 Ironically the heart of the American Clean Energy and Security Act, a.k.a. the “Carbon Cap-and-Trade Bill”, is to 
reduce carbon emissions through a strategy of cap-and-trade. 4 
 
  Until quite recently, the State of California relied heavily on the threat of ex-post lawsuits to 
ensure the safety of private buildings and spaces. Regulation, where passed, has often been weak. 
For example, a law requiring unreinforced masonry buildings to post “earthquake warning” signs 
stating a building may be unsafe in the event of an earthquake had no penalty for non-compliance. 
This law had so little bite that in a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the families of two women 
who died in an unreinforced masonry building in the 2003 San Simeon earthquake, non-compliance 
was not an issue. Instead, according to their attorney, the plaintiffs received $2 million in damages 
because the building owners knew about “the danger and ignored it for years.”
7 This penalty was 
assessed despite the fact that the owners were compliant with all other existing state and local 
seismic safety requirements and on track to comply with a 2018 deadline for seismic reinforcement.   
  California's original hospital earthquake code, The Alquist Hospital Facilities Seismic Safety 
Act, dates back to 1973. Prompted by the 1971 San Fernando Valley earthquake, it required all newly 
constructed hospital buildings to follow stringent codes. Consequently, according to experts, the 
pace of new hospital construction was relatively slow in California and in 1990 over 83 percent of 
hospital beds were in buildings that did not comply with the Act (Meade and Hillestand, 2007).   
After the 1994 Northridge earthquake – a 6.7M earthquake that hit 20 miles northwest of 
Los Angeles; caused billions of dollars in damage; and left several area hospitals unusable – 
California amended the Act to establish deadlines by which all GAC hospitals had to meet certain 
seismic safety requirements.
8 The goal of the amendment, SB 1953, was to ensure not only the 
structural survival of the State's hospitals but also their continued operation after an earthquake 
(Meade et al., 2002). Table 1 describes some of the key provisions of the mandate, which were 
                                                            
7 Press release from Friedman | Rubin Trial Lawyers 
8 Six facilities had to evacuate within hours of the earthquake and 23 had to suspend some or all services. See Schultz et 
al. (2003) and http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/FDD/seismic_compliance/SB1953/SeismicRegs/hssa.pdf for details. 5 
 
finalized in March of 1998.
9 By January 2001, all hospitals were to submit a survey of the seismic 
vulnerability of its building and a compliance plan. Over 90 percent met this requirement (Alesch 
and Petak, 2004). About 70 percent of hospital buildings were deemed to have major non-structural 
elements that were not adequately braced to withstand a major earthquake.
10 Hospitals faced a 
January 1, 2002 deadline for bracing these systems. While we know of no estimates of compliance, 
this requirement was viewed as a relatively minor aspect of the law. Nonetheless, some (though 
relatively few) hospitals have requested extensions to comply with this aspect of the mandate.  
The first major deadline was January 2008 (or January 2013 with an extension).
11 By this 
date, all hospitals were to have retrofitted collapse-hazard buildings or taken them out of operation. 
About 40 percent of hospital buildings were deemed collapse hazards; only 99 or about 20 percent 
of all hospitals had no such buildings and were thereby in compliance with the 2008 requirements 
(Meade et al. 2002; Meade and Hillestand, 2007). By January 1, 2030, the final SB 1953 deadline, all 
GAC buildings must be usable following a strong quake. While the legislature thought that hospitals 
would retrofit collapse-hazard buildings by 2008/2013 and then replace them completely by 2030, 
most hospitals have chosen to rebuild from the outset. This has effectively moved the final deadline 
up from 2030 to 2008/2013 and caused an unprecedented growth in hospital construction.  
Recognizing that most hospitals would not meet the 2008/2013 deadlines and that initial 
building assessments were crude, the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD) authorized on November 14, 2007 a voluntary program allowing hospitals with collapse-
hazard buildings to use a “state-of-the-art" technology called HAZUS (Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard) 
to re-evaluate their seismic risk. Interested hospitals must submit a written request, their seismic 
                                                            
9 See http://www.oshpd.state.ca.us/FDD/SB1953/index.htm. 
10 For details of how buildings were categorized, see Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, Summary of 
Hospital Seismic Performance Ratings, April 2001. http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/FDD/SB1953/sb1953rating.pdf 
11 About 88 percent of hospitals in operation in 2005 applied for an extension to the 2008 deadline and 85 percent (or 96 
percent of applicants) received them.  6 
 
evaluation report, and a supplemental report identifying how the original assessment was inaccurate. 
As of August 2008, over 37 percent of GAC hospitals had submitted a HAZUS request.
12 
Participation moves the compliance deadline to 2013, if any buildings are still deemed collapse-
hazards, or to 2030, if all buildings are reclassified as able to withstand a major earthquake.  
Despite the extensions and reclassifications, many hospitals are already engaging in major 
capital investment projects. Figure 1 shows the mean and median value of hospital construction in 
progress since 1996. After 2001, the year hospitals submitted their building surveys, the mean value 
of construction in progress rose sharply, from $5.5 to almost $14 million (in 2006 terms).
 
Construction costs increases drive some of this. While median construction increased as well, this 
trend started as early as 1996, two years before the details of SB 1953 were finalized. That the 
median is well below the mean value of construction in progress implies that a few hospitals are 
spending a lot on construction while the typical hospital is spending much less. Thus, the increase in 
construction is likely driven by hospitals disproportionately affected by the seismic retrofit mandate 
and is not simply a general trend.  
 
Data and Methods 
  To estimate the effect of SB 1953 on hospital operations, we need to measure exposure to 
the mandate. Exposure is determined by two factors: (1) a hospital’s location, specifically the 
inherent seismic risk associated with it, and (2) the quality of its buildings. Because building quality 
may be correlated with hospital operations even absent SB 1953 – e.g., hospitals with more decrepit 
buildings may be in worse financial condition – we rely on underlying seismic risk to measure 
exposure. Seismic risk is measured by the peak ground acceleration factor, pga, or the maximum 
                                                            
12 Based on author’s calculations from data available here: 
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/FDD/Regulations/Triennial_Code_Adoption_Cycle/HAZUS_Summary_Report.pdf  7 
 
expected ground acceleration that will occur with a 10 percent probability within the next 50 years 
normalized to Earth's gravity.
13  This measure is from the California Geological Survey (CGS) and is 
matched to every GAC hospitals in the State based on exact location. 
We assess the relationship between a hospital’s seismic risk and several measures of hospital 
operations – closures, consolidations and changes in the provision of uncompensated care. Closures 
are based on OSHPD’s Annual Utilization Reports and the California Hospital Association’s records 
for 1996-2006.
14 Consolidation data was obtained through a request to OSHPD. Uncompensated 
care is identified from the 2002 and 2005 Annual Hospital Disclosure Reports (AHDR) as indigent 
care GAC days, emergency department visits and clinic visits and is distinct from days/visits 
reimbursed by county indigent programs. We do not use earlier ADHR data because of changes in 
reporting of service provision.
 15   
Our basic regression specification is: 
Yh = pgah + βXh + γc +εh,c (1) 
 
where Yh is our outcome of interest – separate indicators for whether hospital (h) shutdown or 
merged during the study period or the change in the number of days of care provided to indigent 
patients; pgah is a hospital's inherent seismic risk, as measured by its predicted peak ground 
acceleration factor; Xh is a hospital's observable characteristics, and c is a county fixed effect.  
County fixed effects allow us to control for persistent differences in outcomes that are 
correlated with broad geographic seismic risk patterns. This is important because coastal areas in 
California are generally wealthier and higher seismic risk than inland areas. In all regressions, we also 
                                                            
13 This is a standard measure of seismic risk. See http://www.consrv.ca.gov/cgs/rghm/psha/ofr9608/Pages/index.aspx 
14 http://www.calhealth.org/public/press/Article%5C107%5CClosedHospitals-10-30-08.pdf  
15 Based on discussions with OSHPD, we were advised to not use the data prior to 2001. Results using 2002 to 2006 are 
quite similar but somewhat less precisely estimated.   8 
 
control for a basic set of hospital characteristics as of 1992 – indicators for whether the hospital was 
public, for-profit or not-for-profit (the omitted category), the total number of licensed beds, the 
license age as of 1992 and its square and whether the hospital is in a rural area. We also control for 
the hospital’s teaching status – whether it had an accredited residency program – and whether it is 
part of a multi-system chain. Due to data limitations, teaching and multi-system status are measured 
as of 1996, two years before the details of SB1953 were finalized.  
We analyze closures and mergers, which are both dichotomous outcomes, using both linear 
probability and probit models. We assess changes in uncompensated care using linear regressions. 
To allow for spatial correlation in seismic risk and hospital operations, we cluster all standard errors 
by city. 
Our identification strategy, which isolates the mandate’s effect on hospital operations so 
long as underlying seismic risk is as good as randomly assigned within counties, is plausible for 
several reasons. First, most hospitals in the State were built between 1940 and 1970, at a very early 
stage in our understanding of seismic risk and well before the development of modern seismic safety 
standards. Second, new construction has been slow relative to estimates of a reasonable building 
lifespan (Meade et al., 2002). And, although many hospitals have built new additions, most are in 
their original location (Jones 2004). Many of the new additions have been so well integrated into the 
original hospital structure that they will need to be replaced along with the older buildings (Jones 
2004). Combined with high seismic variability at relatively small distances (e.g., see Appendix Figure 
1), the result is that well-performing hospitals are unlikely to have selected into ``better" locations 
(along seismic risk dimensions), at least within a locality. Finally, this assumption is consistent with 
discussions between the authors and seismologists, who lament the fact that seismic risk is factored 
into building construction on only a very gross, highly-aggregated level (e.g. by county) and is further 




  Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics for non-federal general acute care hospitals in 
California during our study period, 1996 to 2006. We show the summary statistics for the full sample 
and then separately for hospitals that are above and those that are at or below median seismic risk. 
The first row describes mean seismic risk, as measured by the maximum ground acceleration that is 
expected with a 10 percent probability over the next 50 years, normalized to gravity. Over all, the 
mean seismic risk is just below 0.5g. It varies from a minimum of 0.05 and maximum of 1.15 g's and 
follows a rather bell-shaped distribution (see Appendix Figure 2). The next set of rows show the 
means of the outcomes studied here. About 13 percent of hospitals closed during between 1996 and 
2006; closure rates do not vary across high and low seismic risk areas. About 12 percent of hospitals 
consolidated their licenses (i.e. merged their license with another hospital). Although consolidation 
rates are higher in high pga areas – 13.7 versus 10.7 percent – these differences are not statistically 
significant. Similarly, hospitals in high g areas provide more total days of indigent care but the 
differences is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
The next set of rows provides means for the control variables included in our main 
regressions. About 19 percent are government- owned and 28 percent of the hospitals in our sample 
are investor-owned or for-profit institutions. Although investor-owned are slightly more common 
(29.4 versus 27.3 percent) and government-owned slightly less common (17.5 versus 20.5 percent) in 
above median pga areas, these differences are both small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
About 36 percent of hospitals were part of a multi-system chain in 1996, the first year we have such 
data. This characteristic is relatively invariant across low and high pga areas. Although we do not 
have building age, we can proxy for this by looking at the age of a hospital’s license. We measure age 10 
 
as of 1992, the first year of our annual utilization report data. Consistent with Meade C. and R. 
Hillestand (2007), we find that the average GAC hospital is over 60 years old.  Hospitals in above 
seismic risk-areas are slightly newer – 60.4 versus 62 – although this difference is small and 
statistically insignificant. Starker differences emerge when we look at bed size and teaching status. 
The average GAC hospital had 203 beds in 1992. But, in high pga areas the mean is 234 beds and in 
low pga areas it is only 177. Overall, 26 percent of hospitals have a residency program in place in 
1996. In high pga areas over 30 percent have a program whereas only 22 percent of hospitals in low 
pga areas have one. These differences in bed size and teaching status partly reflect the fact that low 
pga areas are disproportionately rural. About 16 percent of hospitals in low pga area are rural in 
contrast to less than 1 percent in high pga areas. Importantly, our analysis uses within-county 
comparisons in seismic risk, which eliminates much of the urban-rural differences. As we will show 
next, most of our baseline characteristics do not differ systematically with seismic risk once we 
control for county.  
  In Table 3, we look at the within-county correlation between characteristics of the hospital 
itself as well as its neighborhood, defined as the hospital’s zip code of operation and all zip codes 
within a 5-mile radius of it. We run regressions, similar to (1), of a hospital’s 1992 or 1996 
characteristics, depending on availability, as well as the 1989 level and the 1989 to 1999 change in a 
hospital's neighborhood characteristics on seismic risk. In all cases we include an indicator for rural 
status, based on an OSHPD designation, and county fixed effects, because of systematic differences 
in seismic risk across larger areas within the State. 
16 Except where used as a dependent variable for 
the purposes of this randomization check, models also control for a hospital's license age and its 
square, the number of licensed beds in 1992 and dummies for 1992 ownership status. In all models, 
                                                            
16 E.g., San Francisco County is both high seismic risk and high income relative to Sacramento County. 
As a result, our identi_cation uses only within county variation in seismic risk. Within-city variation would 
be even cleaner but many small to medium cities have only one hospital. 
 11 
 
standard errors are clustered at the city level to allow for spatial correlation in seismic risk. 
 Unlike our main results, we generally find no significant correlation between seismic risk 
and our hospital or neighborhood characteristics. Panel A present results for hospital characteristics 
in 1992. The correlation between seismic risk and the probability that a hospital is government-
owned or not-for-profit is small and imprecise. The relationship between seismic risk and a 
hospital’s age, the probability it had an emergency department, or its average length of stay is also 
insignificant.  And the implied effects are small. For example, a 1 standard deviation increase in 
seismic risk, approximately 0.2g, is associated with about 1.7 fewer license years off a base of 61 
years. Moreover, a 1 standard deviation increase in seismic risk implies a 0.7 percentage point lower 
probability of having an emergency room, off a base of 70 percent, and 4 percent longer average 
length of stay. In results not shown here, we also tested for differences by ownership status by 
including interactions between pga and indicators for public and for-profit status (with not-for-
profit the omitted category). We do this since we have found some differences by ownership in the 
way hospitals respond to the mandate (see Chang and Jacobson, 2008). But, we find no evidence 
that baseline hospital characteristics differ significantly by ownership status.  
For 4 of the 5 1996 characteristics presented in Panel B – the share of hospitals with a drug 
detoxification program, the share with a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU), the share with MRIs, 
and the share with blood banks – the correlation with seismic risk is similarly small and imprecise. 
The one exception is the probability of participating in a county indigent care program. A one 
standard deviation increase in seismic risk is associated with an 11 percentage point lower probability 
of participating in the program off a base of about 50 percent. The effects do not differ by 
ownership status.  
Panels C and D provide results for the correlation of seismic risk and the characteristics of 
the neighborhoods surrounding a hospital. We find no significant relationship between seismic risk 12 
 
and the 1989 characteristics of their neighborhoods – the population, the share living below the 
federal poverty line, the share Hispanic, the share 5 to 7 years old, and the log median income – 
regardless of ownership status. When we look at growth in these characteristics between 1989 and 
1999, we find no significant relationship in 4 out of 5 cases. A one standard deviation increase in 
seismic risk is associated with almost 6 percentage points higher growth in the share living below the 
federal poverty line in the neighborhoods surrounding hospitals off a base of 19 percent. Estimates 
by ownership status reveal that the effects are concentrated in the neighborhoods around public and 
not-for-profit hospital. The effect is indistinguishable from zero in the case of for-profit hospitals.  
Nonetheless, in 18 out of 20 cases seismic risk is largely uncorrelated with hospitals 
characteristics, both overall and by ownership status. Thus, we conclude that a hospital’s underlying 
seismic risk is broadly unrelated to a host of pre-SB 1953 hospital characteristics, such as not-for-
profit status, and neighborhood demographics, such as median household income with a 5 mile-
radius of the hospital.  
 
Regression Results 
To the extent that SB 1953 increased the cost of capital, as hospitals compete for scarce 
financing resources, the mandate may have had the unintended consequence of increasing closures. 
For example, if equity and bond ratings decline for those with higher seismic risk (i.e. hospitals with 
higher leverage), some hospitals may have more difficulty financing their day-to-day activities and 
may choose to shut down.
17  
Hospital closures are not new to California and may be an important way for inefficient 
hospital systems to reduce capacity. For our purposes, the important question is whether SB 1953 
had an independent effect on this process. We test this possibility in Table 4 by modeling the 
                                                            
17 In a 2009 California Hospital Association survey of hospital CFOs, 64% of those surveyed said that they were having 
trouble accessing enough “affordable capital” to comply with SB1953. 13 
 
probability that a hospital shuts down after 1996. Over our study period 55 hospitals or almost 12.5 
percent of hospitals closed. We present both linear probability and probit models overall (columns 1 
and 3, respectively) and by ownership status (columns (2 and 4). A shown in columns 1 and 3, 
seismic risk has a significant impact on the probability of closure after 1996: a one standard 
deviation increase in the ground acceleration factor increases the likelihood of closure by 6 to 7 
percentage points off a base of 14 to 15 percent. This effect does not differ by ownership status.  
The results in Table 4 clearly indicate that seismic risk, an important predictor of the impact 
of SB 1953, increases the probability of hospital closure. To further test the validity of this 
conclusion, Appendix Table 1 tests whether seismic risk is correlated with hospital closures between 
1992 and 1996. Of the 16 hospital closures during this period, six of them occurred in 1992 and 
1993, before the Northridge earthquake that prompted the passage of SB 1953, while the rest 
occurred prior to the details of the mandate were finalized. If seismic risk predicts these closures this 
would raise considerable doubt as to the causal effect of the mandate per se.  
We find no evidence to suggest that seismic risk predicts pre-1997 hospital closures. In 
Appendix Table 1, the correlation between seismic risk and closure is negative, small in magnitude 
and indistinguishable from zero across both the OLS and Probit models. Given the relatively low 
rate of closure over this period – just under 4 percent – the Probit model may be more appropriate. 
However, because closures were concentrated in a few counties and closures by ownership status 
varied very little within-counties over this period, we are unable to estimate Probit models with 
interaction effects. Based on the OLS model, however, we find no evidence of seismic risk effects, 
irrespective of ownership status. This suggests that the mandate is not simply exacerbating pre-
existing trends in hospital closures, which were concentrated in for-profit facilities (see Buchmueller 
et al., 2006). It also implies that local governments are not shielding their hospitals from the financial 
pressure associated with SB 1953. Finally, our results highlight the importance of weighing the 14 
 
benefit of having “earthquake-proof” hospitals against the cost of fewer hospitals overall. Whether 
policymakers were aware of this potential cost when they passed SB 1953 is unclear, but seems 
unlikely as the closures disproportionately affect hospitals with higher levels of seismic risk (i.e. the 
very hospitals policy makers wanted to be operational in the event of an earthquake). 
  We next consider the impact of seismic risk on hospital consolidations. We might expect 
consolidations to increase in response to SB 1953 as hospitals attempt to achieve economies of scale 
in service provision or other aspects of hospital operations (Cuellar and Gertler, 2003). This would 
give them more financial flexibility to deal with the cost of the mandate. It may also improve their 
access to “affordable” capital, allowing one or both of the hospitals involved in the merger to more 
easily obtain financing. The results in Table 5 suggest that these possibilities may indeed be 
important. A one-standard deviation increase in the ground acceleration factor increases the 
probability of a merger by 5 to 8 percentage points. Estimates with interactions between seismic risk 
and ownership status are quite imprecise and do not allow us to reject similar effects of the mandate 
on consolidations across for-profit, public and not-for-profit hospitals.
18 Assuming the effects are 
causal and drawing on prior research on hospital mergers, these results point to another potential 
unintended consequence of SB 1953 – an increase in prices.
19 Whether prices actually rose is an area 
for future research.     
In Table 6, we assess whether hospitals that are financially squeezed by the mandate cut back 
on indigent care. When not differentiating by ownership type, as in Exhibit 2, we find small and 
imprecise negative effects of seismic risk on indigent care (not shown here). Breaking the effects out 
by ownership type, however, we find that government-owned hospitals unambiguously respond to 
seismic risk by changing their provision of uncompensated care. A one-standard deviation increase 
                                                            
18 We requested but have thus far not received pre-1997 merger data from the State to run a placebo test like the one 
performed for closures. 
19 Dafny (2005) provides a nice review of the hospital merger literature as well as original evidence on the issue of price 
increases after hospital mergers.  15 
 
in seismic risk is associated with about 330 fewer days of indigent care. This estimate, which is 
distinguishable from zero at the 10 percent level, is driven largely by GAC days (as opposed, for 
example, to psychiatric days). A one-standard deviation increase in seismic risk is associated with 
about 220 fewer indigent GAC days in public hospitals. High seismic risk public hospitals appear to 
reduce indigent ER visits, although our estimate is not statistically distinguishable from zero. They 
do, however, clearly cut free/reduced price clinic visits. A one-standard deviation increase in seismic 
risk is associated with over 900 fewer visits. How hospitals reduce these visits is unclear from our 
data. They may, for example, limit operating hours, the number of patients per hour, or both.  
That public hospitals with greater exposure to SB 1953 reduce uncompensated care suggests 
that the mandate has forced public hospitals to cut back on their altruistic goals, at least in the near 
term. We have found no evidence to suggest that policymakers anticipated this effect as a cost of 
insuring the earthquake safety of all hospitals in the State.  
 
Discussion 
  Seismologists agree that the question of a major earthquake in California is not one of 
whether but when. Researchers at the Southern California Earthquake Center estimate an 80 to 90 
percent chance that a temblor of 7.0 or greater magnitude will hit Southern California before 2024 
(Chong and Becerra, 2005). And earthquake risk is as high, if not higher, in parts of Northern 
California. Thus, California’s desire to safeguard its health care infrastructure is imminently sensible.  
  While ex-ante regulation is the obvious way to handle the market’s failure to ensure access to 
care in the event of a serious earthquake, our results raise some serious questions about the wisdom 
of the current approach. Does the value of retrofitting or rebuilding hospitals to remain operational 
following an earthquake outweigh the cost of fewer hospitals overall? The potential for higher 
hospital prices raise additional issues.  16 
 
  Even putting these unintended consequences aside, the gain from ensuring every hospital’s 
viability post-earthquake may not be worth the direct cost of retrofitting and rebuilding. The most 
comprehensive estimates of the construction costs imposed by SB 1953 range from $45 to $110 
billion. Assuming a modest value of a statistical life of $2 million (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), this 
would imply that 22-55,000 lives would need to be saved for the mandate to be worth the cost. 
Officials attribute 61 deaths to the Northridge Earthquake and some work suggests that an 
additional 100 cardiac arrests can be tied to the quake (Leor et al., 1996).
20 A similar number of 
deaths have been attributed to the Loma Prieta Earthquake, which occurred 5 years earlier south of 
the Bay Area, and the Sylmar Earthquake, which occurred in northern Los Angeles County in 
1971.
21 Thus, even assuming (1) the RAND cost estimates are overstated by an order of magnitude, 
(2) deaths are undercounted by an order of magnitude, and (3) earthquake-proof hospitals could 
have prevented all deaths, the benefits of the mandate hardly seem worth the cost.
22 
Obviously, this back-of-the-envelope calculation is a gross oversimplification. Injuries may 
be more common than deaths – the Northridge, Loma Prieta and Sylmar earthquakes each caused 
several thousand injuries – and smoothly functioning hospitals may be indispensable for treating the 
injured and providing ongoing care to existing patients. Nonetheless, our work suggests that the 
costs of SB 1953 likely swamp the benefits.    
 
Alternative Approach 
Given the high risk of a devastating earthquake in California and evidence that private 
parties do little to insure against earthquake risk (e.g, see Palm (1981) and Palm (1995)), the broad 
                                                            
20 Estimates of deaths attributable to the Northridge quake vary somewhat, although all are under 100. The number 
reported here is from the California Geological Survey: 
http://www.consrv.ca.gov/cgs/geologic_hazards/earthquakes/Pages/northridge.aspx; 
21 See Nolte (1999) and and http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/states/events/1971_02_09.php 
22 Many of the Sylmar deaths were caused by the collapse of a VA hospital. VA hospitals are not subject to SB 1953.  17 
 
goals of SB 1953 and, in particular the move away from an ex-post litigation approach, seem 
sensible. But more cost-efficient regulatory approaches may exist. For example, the State could pass 
a “functional” requirement that each GAC hospital “provide” a certain number of earthquake-proof 
beds. A hospital could provide these beds by retrofitting or rebuilding its own infrastructure 
according to SB 1953 standards. Alternatively, a hospital could contract with other hospitals within a 
defined area to provide those beds. In other words, to cover their burden, hospitals that faced a high 
cost of retrofitting could contract with hospitals that could more cost-effectively provide 
earthquake-safe beds. In this way, retrofitting would be concentrated among the hospitals in a 
market that could most cost-effectively do so.      
  This approach is akin to a carbon-trading system. Instead of permits to pollute, hospitals 
would have earthquake proof bed obligations. OSHPD would determine the number of beds each 
hospital is required to provide as well as the geographic boundaries of its market. Following the Acid 
Rain Program, the allocation could be based on the average of beds licensed and staffed by each 
hospitals in a three or four year period prior (e.g., 1993-1996) to the mandate. Hospitals could then 
trade bed obligations with other hospitals in the same market. In this way, hospitals that have a high 
cost of providing retrofitted beds will pay those with lower costs to provide them. The significant 
variation in underlying seismic risk (and therefore significant variation in the cost of new seismically 
safe construction), suggests that even in the absence of any economies of scale, there will be 
significant variation in the cost of providing seismically safe beds. 
In markets with only one hospital, this trading system will not be feasible. For markets with 
at least two hospitals, however, this system would provide a more cost-effective means to ensure 
“operational readiness” in the event of a quake. The cost-efficiency should be greatest in markets 
with the most hospitals. Moreover, this system should prevent many of the closures and possibly 
mergers caused by SB 1953. 18 
 
Lessons from the US experience with environmental policy regulation, suggest that this type 
of market-based policy instrument could be well-suited to the problem of ensuring hospital seismic 
safety (see Stavins 1998). As in the case of pollution abatement, hospitals likely face very different 
costs of compliance, even within the same region. Some hospitals may have building’s that are close 
to the end of their lifespan and thus nearing a point to retrofit or rebuild even in the absence of the 
mandate; others may be in relatively new but still non-compliant buildings. Similarly, some hospital 
buildings may be on lots that – because they sit on the side of a hill or on relatively porous soil – are 
fundamentally costlier to retrofit. Allowing these hospitals to contract amongst themselves would 
ensure the availability of earthquake proof beds at the lowest cost. 
California has built a large infrastructure to enforce SB 1953. We do not anticipate (or even 
recommend) that the State reverses course. The proposed system, however, can provide lessons for 
policy makers considering one-size-fits all regulation. In the most direct sense, this proposal could 
prove useful in Seattle, where the City Council is currently considering citywide seismic safety 
measures.
23 But areas prone to hurricanes, tornados, or other disaster scenarios may benefit from 
similar approaches to cost-effectively improve the performance of critical facilities in the event of 
catastrophe. More generally, using a cap-and-trade type system may be more efficient than a one-
size-fits-all mandate in changing standards for an entire class of goods or services when there is 
heterogeneity in production. Thus, even where ex-ante regulation clearly dominates ex-post 
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Source: OSHPD’s Annual Hospital Disclosure Reports, 1996-2006 22 
 
Table 1. Key Provisions of SB 1953 
Date Requirement 
Jan 2001  Submit risk assessment with NPC and SPC ratings for all buildings and a 
compliance report plan. 
 
Jan 2002  Retrofit nonstructural elements (e.g. power generators) and submit a plan for 
complying with structural safety requirements. 
 
Jan 2008 –  
Jan 2013 
Collapse hazard buildings should be retrofitted or closed. Extensions available 
through 2013. 
 
Jan 2030  Retrofit to remain operational following a major seismic event. 
 
Notes: 
SPC stands for “Structural Performance Category"; NPC stands for “Non-structural Performance Category."       See 
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/fdd/sb1953/FinalJan2008Bul.PDF for extension information. 
  23 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Seismic Risk Status  
  Full Sample  Above Median pag  At or Below Median 
pga 







Closed after 1996  0.134  0.133  0.134 
 
Consolidated after 1996  0.121  0.137  0.107 
 







Public,  1992  0.186 0.171 0.200 
 
For-Profit,  1992  0.283 0.294 0.273 
 
Not-for-profit,  1992  0.531 0.535 0.527 
 
Multi-system,  1996 0.364 0.370 0.359 
 
















Residency Program, 1996  0.261  0.309  0.221 
 
Rural  0.090 0.005 0.163 
 
Observations  456 211 245 
  
Notes: Seismic risk is measured by the peak ground acceleration (pga) expected with a 10 percent probability over the 







Table 3. Seismic Risk and the Distribution of Hospital Observables 
  Panel A: 1992 Hospital Characteristics 24 
 















R-squared  0.352 0.108 0.100 0.268 0.089 
Mean Dep Var  0.213  0.500  61.0  0.703  1.61 
Observations  370 370 370 370 370 
 
  Panel B: 1996 Hospital Characteristics 





















R-squared  0.033 0.106 0.096 0.111 0.423 
Mean Dep Var  0.155  0.145  0.456  0.675  0.508 
Observations  370 370 370 370 370 
 
  Panel C: Neighborhood Characteristics, 1989 



















R-squared  0.745 0.296 0.514 0.454 0.459 
Mean Dep Var  292165  0.130  0.249  0.179  34924 
Observations  369 369 369 369 369 
 
  Panel D: Growth in Neighborhood Characteristics, 1989-1999 



















R-squared  0.412 0.402 0.351 0.347 0.564 
Mean Dep Var  0.105  0.187  0.349  0.079  0.315 
Observations  369 369 369 369 369 
Notes: Dependent variables are from OSHPD's Hospital Annual Utilization Reports (Panel A), OSHPD’s Hospital 
Annual Financial Data (Panel B), the 1990 census (Panel C) and the 1990 and 2000 census (Panel D). Dependent 
variables in Panels C and D are based on zip codes within 5-miles of a hospital. All models include county fixed effects 
and a rural indicator. Except where used as a dependent variable, models also control for a hospital's license age and its 
square, the number of licensed beds in 1992 and dummies for 1992 ownership status. Standard errors are clustered at the 
city level to allow for spatial correlation in seismic risk. 25 
 
Table 4. The Impact of Seismic Risk on the Probability of Hospital Closures: 1997-2006 





      

















































Probability  0.134 0.134 0.163 0.163 
Adj. R-squared  0.048  0.043  --  -- 
Observations  429 429 320 320 
 
Notes: All models include county fixed effects. We also include controls for the number of licensed beds in 1992, the 
license age in 1992 and its square, 1992 ownership status (government-owned or for-profit, with not-for-profit status 
excluded), rural status, 1996 teaching status and 1996 multi-hospital system status. Teaching status and system status are 
measured as of 1996 because of data limitations. Standard errors are clustered at the city level to allow for spatial 
correlation in seismic risk. 26 
 


























































Probability  0.121 0.121 0.179 0.179 
Adj. R-squared  .205  .205  --  -- 
Observations  429 429 291 291 
 
Notes: All models include county fixed effects. We also include controls for the number of licensed beds in 1992, the 
license age in 1992 and its square, 1992 ownership status (government-owned or for-profit, with not-for-profit status 
excluded), rural status, 1996 teaching status and 1996 multi-hospital system status. Teaching status and system status are 
measured as of 1996 because of data limitations. Standard errors are clustered at the city level to allow for spatial 













Table 6. The Impact of Seismic Risk on Changes in the Provision of Uncompensated Care: 2002-
2005 
    
  Total Days  Total GAC 
Days 
ER Visits  Clinic Visits 
      


























































Mean  days/visits  271 213 302 302 
Adj.  R-squared  .030 .042 .103 .054 
Observations  353 353 353 353 
  
Notes: All models include county fixed effects. We also include controls for the number of licensed beds in 1992, the 
license age in 1992 and its square, 1992 ownership status (government-owned or for-profit, with not-for-profit status 
excluded), rural status, 1996 teaching status and 1996 multi-hospital system status. Teaching status and system status are 
measured as of 1996 because of data limitations. Standard errors are clustered at the city level to allow for spatial 
correlation in seismic risk. 
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Appendix Figure 1: A map of expected ground acceleration in the event of an earthquake similar to the great 




Source: U.S. Geological Survey 29 
 
 Sources: U.S. Geological Survey; OSHPD 
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Appendix Table 1. The Impact of Seismic Risk on the Probability of Hospital Closures: 1992-1996 





      







































Probability  0.036 0.036 0.069  -- 
Adj. R-squared  0.121  0.121  --  -- 
Observations  443 443 231  -- 
 
Notes: All models include county fixed effects. We also include controls for the number of licensed beds in 1992, the 
license age in 1992 and its square, 1992 ownership status (government-owned or for-profit, with not-for-profit status 
excluded), and rural status. Standard errors are clustered at the city level to allow for spatial correlation in seismic risk. 
 